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In early 2008 the Finance Ministry issued a consultation paper on “Requirement of 
Public Holding for Listing”.  The Finance Minister also declared in his 2009-10 
budget speech that the threshold for non-promoter public shareholding for all listed 
companies would be raised in a phased manner.  This paper discusses the cross-
country research on concentrated share ownership and household participation in 
equity markets.  The paper argues that instead of ‘forcing’ controlling shareholders 
to dilute their positions the government can achieve its objective more effectively by 
enhancing minority investor protection in the short run and creating more owners by 
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Equity Markets with Controlling Shareholders 
 
 
Equity markets in India account for a small proportion of household savings and corporate financing.  
The RBI Report on Currency and Finance 2005-06 concludes in its chapter on financial markets, 
“Despite significant improvement in trading and settlement infrastructure, risk management system, 
liquidity and containment of volatility, the role of the Indian capital market (equity and debt) has 
remained less significant as is reflected in the savings in the form of capital market instruments and 
resources raised by the corporates.”.   
 
The  small  role  of  stock  markets  in  savings  and  investments  has  implications  for  stock  market 
efficiency.  The Raghuram Rajan Committee
1 finds that only the market for the top 200 stocks, their 
derivatives and index derivatives satisfies the three conditions for an efficient market: immediacy, 
depth  and  resilience.
2      Trading  statistics  show  that  trading  on  the  Indian  stock  exchanges  is 
concentrated in select securities.  The top 10 securities account for almost a third of total turnover and 
the top 100 securities account for 80-90% of total turnover.  The volatility of the Indian stock market 
continues to be on the higher side relative to other developed and developing country markets.  
 
The functioning of equity markets is linked to the pattern of equity ownership in terms of trading 
behaviour and access to information and analysis. In India, as in most countries, other than the US and 
UK, ownership of  firms is concentrated  in family  based business  groups.
3   Since  the  controlling 
shareholder  does  not  trade  his  holdings  the  ‘floating  stock’  and  market  liquidity  is  reduced.  
Concerned by the lack of liquidity in stock markets, in early 2008, the Finance Ministry issued a 
consultation  paper
4  which  would  require  companies  to  maintain  a  minimum  public  shareholding 
higher than current levels. It also proposes to limit  the word ‘public’ to individual investors and 
exclude  financial  institutions  and  corporate  bodies.    The  proposals  are  yet  to  be  finalized  for 
implementation.The government adopted a similar approach in the 1970s when it required MNCs in 
India to dilute their shareholdings.  However, at that time pricing was under the Controller of Capital 
Issues which fixed prices that were extremely attractive for buyers.  In the current situation investors 
                                                       
1 “A Hundred Small Steps : Report of the  Committee on Financial Sector Reforms”, Government of India, 
Planning Commission, New Delhi, 2009 
2 Immediacy is the ability to execute trades of small size immediately without moving prices adversely. Depth 
refers to the impact cost of executing large trades. Resilience is the speed with which prices and liquidity of the 
market revert back to normal conditions after a large trade has taken place. 
3 In fact according to Villalonga and Amit (2008) even in the United States, where ownership dispersion is at its 
highest, founding families exercise a significant degree of control over a third of the 500 largest corporations 
and over more than half of all public corporations. 
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may be reluctant to invest in shares and controlling shareholders unwilling to issue shares at prices 
acceptable to public investors, especially if firms have alternative sources of financing.  
 
Recent research on financial development has highlighted the role of minority investor protection in 
the  presence  of  controlling  shareholders.    Enhanced  minority  investor  protection  reduces  the 
attractiveness of concentrated ownership by reducing the ‘private benefits of control’.  It will also 
increase the attractiveness of ‘public shareholding’ by assuring minority investors that they will not be 
expropriated.  According to several indicators the current level of minority investor protection in India 
is  inadequate.    This  paper  argues  that  instead  of  mandating  a  high  minimum  level  of  public 
shareholding a better approach to stock market development would be to significantly strengthen 
minority investor protection.    
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 describes the role of equity financing and the relatively 
small contribution of public equity markets in corporate financing in India.  Sections 2 examines the 
relatively small role for equity markets in household savings in India and the reasons for cross country 
differences in household participation rates in stock markets.  Section 3 reviews the literature on 
concentrated ownership and its relationship with minority investor protection.  Section 4 provides 
information on investor protection issues in the Indian market and Section 5 concludes. 
 
1.  Equity financing 
 
This section reviews the basic theory of corporate financing to highlight the importance of equity 
financing relative to other sources of external financing.  This is supported by empirical evidence 
relating the development of equity markets to overall economic growth.  Finally, we assess the role of 
equity markets in corporate financing in India, especially in the recent high growth period. 
Role of Equity markets in corporate finance 
In the perfect market models of Modigliani-Miller capital structure is irrelevant and there is nothing 
special about equity.  However, information asymmetry between ‘insiders’ – managers or controlling 
shareholders - and outside financiers gives rise to the familiar problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.    The  moral  hazard  problem  is  usually  referred  to  ‘agency  problems’  in  which  outside 
financiers are principals and the inside managers or controlling shareholders are agents.  In several 
models of moral hazard outside debt is the optimal security to address agency problems (Tirole 2006).  
The ‘default’ characteristic of debt, when inside equity investors receive no payoff in the event of 
default, provides the maximum incentive for insiders to ‘behave’.  In the case of adverse selection 
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information sensitive than equity and the informed inside issuer suffers less underpricing as a result of 
adverse selection.  Debt is also favoured because of the benefits of interest tax shields. 
The ‘default’ characteristic of debt also gives rise to costs of financial distress.  Interest on debt and 
scheduled repayments are mandatory whereas dividends are discretionary and equity is in perpetuity.  
When internal cash flows are low and the firm is financially constrained in raising external funds (a 
situation  of  ‘financial  distress’)  the  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection  problems  may  be  severe 
enough to force the firm to forego profitable investment opportunities in order to meet debt servicing 
obligations.  Situations of financial distress also heighten the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and debtholders.  This conflict gives rise to the ‘debt overhang’ problem of Myers (1977) where even 
a positive NPV project may not be in the interest of shareholders to finance.  While shareholders bear 
the full cost of the project they share the value addition with debtholders.  In a situation of financial 
distress the residual value for the shareholders may be less than their investment.  Shareholders may 
also have a perverse incentive to take on a negative NPV project so long as it has a sufficiently 
volatile cash flow – referred to as the ‘asset substitution’ problem.  These expected costs of financial 
distress reduce ex ante firm value. 
The optimal capital structure, therefore, requires a sufficient amount of equity so that the costs of 
financial distress are not excessive.  In fact private placement of equity to financial institutions such as 
private equity and venture capital funds can overcome some of the moral hazard and adverse selection 
disadvantages of public equity through due diligence and structuring of equity claims.  These kinds of 
equity financing are especially important for new and high growth firms which are the major drivers 
of innovation and economic growth. 
The  empirical  relationship  between  economic  growth  and  financial  development,  including  stock 
market development, has been examined by Levine and Zrevos (1998).  They find that the initial level 
of stock market liquidity and the initial level of banking development (bank credit) are positively and 
significantly correlated with future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity 
growth  over  the  next  18  years,  even  after  controlling  for  initial  income,  schooling,  inflation, 
government spending, the black market exchange rate premium, and political stability.  According to 
the study, the evidence suggests that stock markets provide different financial functions from those 
provided by banks, or else they would not both enter the growth regression significantly. The authors 
do not find that stock market size, as measured by market capitalization divided by GDP, is robustly 
correlated with growth. According to the authors, “Simply listing on the national stock exchange does 
not necessarily foster resource allocation.  Rather, it is the ability to trade ownership of the economy’s 
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Equity Financing in India 
 
In  India  equity  financing  by  a  company  is  classified  as  public  issues,  rights  issue  and  private 
placement. Public issue can be further classified into Initial public offer (IPO) and Further public offer 
(FPO). In a private placement an issuer makes an issue of securities to a select group of persons not 
exceeding 49, and which is neither a rights issue nor a public issue. Since these securities are allotted 
to  a  few  sophisticated  and  experienced  investors,  the  stringent  public  disclosure  regulations  and 
registration requirements are relaxed.    
 
During  the  recent  high  growth  period  of  2003-04  to  2008-09  public  equity  issues  increased 
significantly  compared  to  the  immediately  preceding  years.  In  2007-08  equity  issues  crossed 
Rs.80,000 crores, almost equal to the total amount raised in the previous three years.  However, with 
the onset of the financial crisis equity issues were down to approximately Rs.15,000 crores in 2008-
09.  As shown in Table 1 during this period equity financing,  while large in absolute terms, was only 
about  7%  of  the  total  debt  financing  in  the  form  of  bank  credit  and  private  placement  of  debt 
securities.  The above comparison is based on data for equity issues and private placement that also 
includes financial firms.  From the perspective of financing of real investments it may be appropriate 
to exclude financial firms.  When financial firms are excluded equity issues by non financial firms 
account for only 5% of the total of private placements by non financial firms and bank credit.   
 











 2002-03    1,457  137,306  66,948 
 2003-04    18,949  108,367  63,901 
 2004-05    24,388  271,366  83,406 
 2005-06    27,372  405,052  96,473 
 2006-07    32,901  396,400  145,866 
 2007-08    85,426  401,650  212,725 
 2008-09    14,272  399,400  202,745 
Total  
2003-04 to 
2008-09  203,308  1,982,235  805,115 
 
Source: Public equity Issues  SEBI Handbook 2009 Table 12; 
Private Placement SEBI Handbook 2009 Table 6; Bank credit 
RBI Handbook 2009 Table 48 
 
Overall, public equity issues appear to account for a small proportion of total financing.  It is useful to 
point out that while the contribution of equity markets is small bond markets are non existent.  Most 
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Private  placement  of  shares  or  convertible  securities  by  a  listed  issuer  can  be  of  two  types: 
Preferential allotment and Qualified Institutions Placement (QIP).  QIP was introduced in 2006 and is 
limited to Qualified Institutional Buyers which basically consists of financial institutions but excludes 
promoters.  Preferential allotments can be made to financial institutions as well as promoters. In order 
to prevent the misuse of preferential allotments SEBI requires that the price cannot be below the 
average of the weekly high and low of the closing prices during the six months preceding the relevant 
date; or the average of the weekly high and low of the closing prices during the two weeks preceding 
the relevant date.  There is also a there year lock-in period for the securities allotted on preferential 
basis to promoter or promoter group.  As can be seen from Table 2 QIPs were large during the peak 
year of 2007-08 but negligible during 2008-09 with the decline in the stock markets.  Interestingly 
preferential allotments were large during the same year perhaps representing an attempt by promoters 
to raise their holdings at low prices. 
 
Table 2: Equity raised through Qualified Institutions' Placement 







2006-07  4,963   
2007-08  25,525  24,027 
2008-09  189  40,608 
 
Source: QIP: SEBI Bulletins, Preferential allotments: NSE Fact Book 
2009 (page 37) 
 
It is useful to compare the pattern of domestic financing with the pattern of external capital inflows as 
presented in Table 3.   The three main sources of capital inflows are foreign direct investment (FDI), 
foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and external commercial borrowings (ECB).   Almost 80% of FDI 
is in the form of equity, with the balance representing reinvested earnings.  Portfolio investment is in 
the form of FII investment which is almost 90% in equity.    There is also a modest amount of 
portfolio investment in the form of ADRs and GDRs.  External Commercial Borrowings represent 
loans and were large during 2007-08 and 2008-09. Over the period 2003-04 to 2008-09 total FDI was 
more than twice the amount of ECB and FPI was almost equal to the ECB.  Therefore, equity flows 
account for almost three quarters of the total external capital inflows during this period.   
 
This  pattern  of  external  capital  inflows  is  not  fully  market  determined  because  of  government 
restrictions on debt inflows in the form of ECB and FPI.  However, it is possible to conjecture that 
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Table 3: External Capital Inflows 
 






2002-03     24,397   4,675   (8,263) 
2003-04     19,830   51,898   (13,274) 
2004-05     26,947   41,419   24,149  
2005-06     39,457   55,357   11,610  
2006-07     102,652   31,630   73,889  
2007-08     137,434   118,348   91,310  
2008-09     158,579   (64,206)  32,397  
2003-04 to 
2008-09  484,899   234,446   220,081  
 
Source: RBI Handbook 2009 Table 143 
 
Summing up, the role of public equity issues in external financing of firms is small.   Large amounts 
of  equity  are  issued  to  promoters  through  preferential  allotments.    Firms  also  use  Qualified 
Institutional Placements (QIPs) for raising significant amounts of equity.  The majority of external 
capital inflow is also invested in equity.   
 
 
2.  Equity in Household savings 
 
Household savings play an important role in financing the savings-investment gap of government and 
corporate sectors.   This section examines the allocation of household financial savings to equity as 
well as survey data on participation by households in equity markets in India.   The low participation 
rates are considered a puzzle and several studies attempt to provide explanations.  The factors which 
affect  participation  rates  will  be  relevant  for  policy  makers  in  terms  of  increasing  household 
participation rates. 
 
Household financial savings in “Shares and debentures” in India 
 
In  India  the  savings  of  the  household  sector  are  estimated  separately  under  financial  assets  and 
physical  assets.    The  savings  of  the  household  sector  in  physical  assets  are  not  estimated 
independently. CSO estimates the household investment and transfers the same to the account of 
household saving in physical assets. The savings of the household sector in financial assets, gross 
financial savings, is measured as the change in financial assets of households.  It is estimated using 
the  economy-wide  Flow  of  Funds  (FOF).    The  economy  is  classified  into  six  sectors  and  nine 
instruments.    The  six  sectors  are  corporate;  public;  rest  of  world;  banking  and  other  financial 
institutions;  and  the  residual  being  the  household  sector  comprising  heterogeneous  entities  like 
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concerns, and non-profit institutions.  The household sector is treated as the residual sector because 
unlike the corporate and government sectors, which have their balance sheets and income-expenditure 
accounts at annual intervals to base their annual savings estimates on, the household sector does not 
have such accounts for all its constituents such as pure households, HUF, self employed persons, 
trusts, proprietorships etc.  
 
Almost 50% of household savings takes the form of physical assets.  Over 50% of financial savings is 
in bank deposits and claims on government.  Life insurance funds account for 15-20 %.
5 
 
As  shown  in  Table  4  the  proportion  of  ‘shares  and  debentures’  in  gross  financial  savings  has 
generally been less than 5% during the period 1990-91 to 2008-09, except in the initial years and the 
most recent period. The proportion of shares and debentures in total financial savings declined to 3% 
in 2008-09.  This may reflect the decline in share prices as well as the transfer of savings from stocks 
and mutual funds to bank deposits.  
 
Table 4:  Per cent of Gross Financial Savings of the Household Sector in the form of  
Shares and Debentures and Life Insurance Funds  
 




Year    Total 
Private 
corporate 
business   
Mutual 
funds   Total 
1999-00  7.70%  3.40%  3.40%  11.20% 
2000-01  4.10%  3.10%  1.30%  12.90% 
2001-02  2.70%  1.50%  1.80%  13.50% 
2002-03  1.70%  0.80%  1.30%  15.50% 
2003-04  0.10%  1.10%  1.20%  13.00% 
2004-05  1.10%  1.40%  0.40%  15.10% 
2005-06  4.90%  1.30%  3.60%  13.50% 
2006-07  9.00%  3.70%  5.30%  17.10% 
2007-08  12.40%  4.40%  7.90%  17.40% 
2008-09  2.60%  4.20%  -1.40%  19.50% 
 
Source: SEBI Handbook 2009, Table 104 
 
It is not possible to obtain separate estimates for household savings in shares and debentures.  In the 
recent period mutual funds accounted for almost 75% of the investment in shares and debentures by 
households.  Investment in shares and debentures through mutual funds is more volatile than direct 
investment.  Income/Debt oriented schemes account for about 60% of total asset under management at 
                                                       
5  Given  the  popularity  of  Unit  Linked  Insurance  Plans  (ULIPS)  a  large  proportion  of  this  may  represent 
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the  end  of  March  2008  with  equity  schemes  accounting  for  the  balance  40%.  The  share  of 
Income/Debt oriented schemes increased to 70% in 2008-09.   
 
Household participation rates in stock markets 
 
The theoretical benchmark for household participation in stock markets is 100%.  This is based on the 
result that a risk averse investor will always take some part of an actuarially fair gamble (Arrow 
1970). To the extent shares are seen as at least actuarially fair all households should participate in 
stock markets.  Therefore, even the relatively high level of household participation in the developed 
countries is seen as a puzzle since the participation rates are much below 100%.  Of course, not all 
households  
 
Consistent  with  the  low  share  of  financial  savings  invested  in  shares  and  debentures  household 
surveys also indicate a low rate of participation in stock markets.  The first Survey of Indian Investors 
was  conducted  during1998-99  by  SEBI  and  NCAER.    (SEBI  2009)    A  follow  up  survey  was 
conducted  during  April-December,  2000  based  on  a  sample  of  2,88,081  households  located  in 
geographically dispersed rural and urban areas. The findings of the Survey were published in March, 
2003.  
 
Table 5: Proportion of Investor Households in all Households in States Owning Different  
Type of Instruments - All-India  (Top 5 and bottom 5 states by equity participation) 
 
States   
 Total 
Equity   
 Total 
Bonds   
 Total 
M.F.   
 Total 
Investors   
Top 5         
 Gujarat    24.1%  26.2%  17.4%  34.9% 
 Pondicherry    13.1%  3.2%  20.9%  16.2% 
 Chandigarh    12.1%  13.6%  4.7%  24.2% 
 Goa    9.7%  2.3%  0.7%  9.8% 
 A.P.    8.5%  18.4%  6.7%  24.0% 
 Haryana    8.1%  8.9%  5.1%  13.6% 
Bottom 5         
 Tamil Nadu    3.9%  4.5%  19.9%  7.7% 
 West Bengal    3.4%  3.2%  4.9%  4.7% 
 Kerala    3.1%  2.7%  9.1%  4.9% 
 Delhi    3.0%  6.7%  13.9%  7.8% 
 Maharashtra    2.5%  2.1%  9.5%  4.1% 
 All India    3.7%  5.4%  6.7%  7.4% 
 
Source: SEBI Handbook 2009, Table 96 
 
 
According to the survey, as shown in Table 5, about 3.7% of households hold stocks directly.  About 
7% of household invest in mutual funds. Since the break-up of the mutual fund investors between 
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the stock market.   The  extent of direct participation  in equity markets varies significantly  across 
states.  Gujarat has the highest participation rate of 24% which is similar to the direct participation 
rate in the US. 
 
An alternative estimate of the participation rate is provided in the Raghuram Rajan Committee Report.  
There are roughly 10 million depository accounts in the country. Assuming one account per family 
and assuming five individuals per family, direct ownership of equities does not exceed 50 million 
people.  This would give a participation rate close to that obtained by the household surveys. 
 
There are a few basic facts about the determinants of household participation in the stock market. 
Participation is strongly increasing  in wealth.  This can  arise if participation involves fixed costs.  
Wealthier households who have more to invest will find the fixed cost less of a deterrent. Household 
education is another determinant.  Education reduces the fixed costs of participating, by making it 
easier for potential investors to understand the risk-reward trade-offs in the equity markets, and to 
deal with the mechanics of setting up an account, executing trades, etc.  
 
International  data  on  direct  stock  market  participation  is  available  from  Giannetti  and  Koskinen 
(2010) for 26 countries.  As can be seen in Table 6, which gives the data for a select group of 
countries,  while  the  richer  countries  generally  have  higher  participation  rates  there  is  significant 
difference within them.  For example, while Australia has a direct participation rate of 40% in the case 
of France it is only 15%.  India’s participation rate at 3.3% is at the lower end of the countries. 
 
Table 6: Investor participation rates in the domestic stock markets and  
closely held shares (select countries) 
 
Country   
Participation 
rate (direct) 
% closely held 
market 
capitalization 
 Australia   40%  42% 
 UK    30%  34% 
 Japan    30%  45% 
 US    26%  40% 
 Canada    25%  28% 
 France    15%  62% 
 Hong Kong    14%  56% 
 Taiwan    13%  27% 
 Germany   9%  64% 
 Italy   7%  50% 
 India    3%  54% 
 Sri Lanka    2%  48% 
 Turkey   1%  62% 
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Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) find that investor protection measured in several alternative ways is a 
significant variable for explaining cross country variations in the stock market participation rate after 
controlling for per capita income, stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP and average 
years of schooling,    
 
Several papers relate household participation to other less obvious factors.  These include trust and 
insurance penetration.   
 
Investing in equity requires an element of trust since in the case of equity there is no collateral and no 
promised return or repayment..  Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) identify ‘trust’ as an important 
factor determining the rate of stock market participation.  According to them the decision to invest in 
stocks requires not only an assessment of the risk– return trade-off given the existing data, but also an 
act of faith (trust) that stock market information is reliable and that the overall system is fair.   They 
define trust as the subjective probability individuals attribute to the possibility of being cheated. The 
study finds that trust has a positive and significant effect on stock market participation and a negative 
effect  on  dispersion  of  ownership.  These  effects  are  present  even  after  they  control  for  law 
enforcement and legal protection.
 6 
 
The availability of insurance against large negative shocks could encourage risk averse individuals to 
take on the higher risk of stocks in order to earn higher returns.   Gormley, Liu and Zhou (2010) using 
country-level empirical analysis find strong support for a connection between insurance penetration, 
participation  rates,  and  savings.  Stock  market  participation  rates  across  countries  are  positively 
correlated with the presence of a large, private insurance market. This correlation holds strongly even 
after controlling  for other  country-level characteristics,  including measures of investor protection, 
trust, legal origin, and economic development.  
 
While  the  above  studies  provide  evidence  on  factors  associated  with  the  level  of  stock  market 
participation in a cross section of countries it is useful to understand the dynamics of the evolution of 
stock  market  participation  over  time.    Guiso,Haliassos,  Jappelli  (2003)  describe  the  increase  in 
participation rates in Europe during the 1990s.  Prior to this period participation in the stock market 
was limited to a relatively small segment of the population, the few households in the very upper tail 
of the wealth distribution, relatively well educated, and with little exposure to other sources of risk, 
except possibly entrepreneurial risk. This picture changed considerably over the 1990s. In the UK, the 
                                                       
6 Their stock market participation data is the same as that used by Giannetti and Koskinen (2010).  Average trust 
in each country is obtained from the World Values Survey. It is computed as the fraction of individuals in each 
country who reply yes to the question, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 





Page No. 13  W.P.  No.  2011-04-02 
IIMA  ￿  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
proportion of direct stockholders went up from less than 9% in 1983 to 22% in 1998. A large part of 
this development is associated with the privatisation of public utilities that took place in the UK 
before  other  European  countries.  In  Italy  -  the  country  with  the  lowest  direct  participation  -  the 
proportion of households that invest directly in the stock market went up from 4% in 1989 to 7.3% in 
1998, also taking impetus from the privatisation process. Total participation, direct or indirect, rose 
during the 1990s in all European countries and in the US. Most of the increase is due to the growth of 
indirect stockholding: the fraction holding stock directly shows in fact little change.  This highlights 
the role of mutual funds in increasing participation in stock markets. 
 
Summing up, household participation in equity markets is influenced by a variety of factors.  The 
effect  of  factors  such  as  wealth,  education  and  investor  protection  are  relatively  straightforward.  
Researchers have identified other factors such as level of trust and availability of insurance which are 
significant in empirical tests even after controlling for the effects of wealth, education and investor 
protection.  The experience of Europe indicates that privatization can play an important role in stock 
market participation.  The role of mutual funds is also important in enabling indirect participation. 
 
3.  Ownership concentration 
 
Concentrated ownership has been observed in most countries with the exception of US and UK. La 
Porta,  Lopez-De-Silanes  and  Shleifer  (1999)  were  the  first  to  systematically  document  concentrated 
ownership as the norm in most countries.  They examine the ownership structures of the 20 largest 
publicly traded firms in each of the 27 generally richest economies using data for 1995.  The firms are 
classified  into  those  that  are  widely  held  and  those  with  ultimate  owners.  A  corporation  has  a 
controlling shareholder (ultimate owner) if this shareholder’s direct and indirect voting rights in the 
firm exceed 20%. 
 
They find that 36 percent of the firms in their sample are widely held, 30% are family-controlled, 18% 
are  State-controlled,  and  the  remaining  15%  are  divided  between  the  residual  categories.    In  an 
average country, the ultimate family owners control, on average, 25% of the value of the top 20 firms.  
For the sample as a whole at least 69% of the time, families that control firms also participate in 
management.  Overall, the controlling shareholder does not have another large shareholder in the 
same  firm  in  75%  of  the  cases,  and  this  number  is  71%    for  family  controlling  shareholders.  
According to the study, relative to shares with differential voting rights and cross-holdings, pyramidal 
ownership appears to be a more important mechanism used by controlling shareholders to separate 
their cash flow ownership in sample firms from their control rights. 26% of firms that have ultimate 
owners are controlled through pyramids. 
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Concentrated ownership and control gives rise to the problem of private benefits of control.  This is 
the  expropriation  of  minority  shareholders  by  diversion  of  company  resources  through  such 
mechanisms as tunneling  and related party transactions.  The concentrated owner  realizes  the  full 
benefit of any diversion but bears the cost of decline in firm cash flows only to the extent of his 
shareholding in the firm.  A concentrated owner with a 20% shareholding enjoys the full benefit of 
diverting a Rupee of cash flow but suffers only a 20 paisa cost of lower firm cash flows.  Ultimate 
owners can reduce their financial ownership below their control rights by using shares with superior 
voting  rights;  by  organizing  the  ownership  structure  of  the  firm  in  a  pyramid; or  through  cross-
shareholdings.  In this way they are able to derive private benefits of control with the least cost. 
 
In  countries  such  as  the  US  and  UK  ownership  is  relatively  diffused  and  shareholders  control 
managers only indirectly through the board of directors.  This separation of ownership and control 
gives rise to agency costs in the form of managerial perquisite consumption and shirking as well as 
pursuit of non value maximizing  objectives  such as  sales  growth, empire building and employee 
welfare at the cost of firm value.  However, even in these countries a large proportion of shares are 
held by informed, sophisticated institutional investors, many of whom have non negligible stakes.  
They  are  often  referred  to  as  activist  investors,  with  hedge  funds  as  the  most  important  recent 
example.  These countries also have a more active market for corporate control which is expected to 
provide a disciplining effect on management. 
 
Therefore, while concentrated ownership does not suffer from the agency problems of separation of 
ownership and control, it is subject to the problem of ‘private benefits of control’.   Since private 
benefits of control are not observable researchers have attempted to infer the magnitude from market 
transactions.  Dyck  and  Zingales  (2004)  measure  the  extent  of  private  benefits  of  control  as  the 
difference in the price per share paid in a privately negotiated transfer of a controlling block and the 
price that can be observed in the market once investors have absorbed the fact that there will be a new 
controlling shareholder.  The rationale for this method is that the price per share an acquirer pays for 
the controlling block reflects both the cash flow benefits it expects to receive as a shareholder (which 
include the value of any improvements it expects to make in the firm’s performance) and any private 
benefits stemming from its controlling position. By contrast, the market price of a share just after the 
change in control is announced should reflect only the cash flow benefits that all shareholders expect 
to receive under the new management.  The study is based on 393 control transactions that took place 
between 1990 and 2000, in companies representing 39 different countries.  
 
The study finds that control premiums averaged 14% of the equity value of a firm.  In countries where 
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developed  by  several  measures  such  as  number  of  IPOs/  population,  the  number  of  listed 
firms/population, and the external market capitalization relative to GDP.  Their explanation for this 
relationship is that in countries where a controlling party can appropriate a larger share of the value of 
a company, entrepreneurs will be more reluctant to take their companies public. If they sell a minority 
position, outside investors will be willing to pay less for it than what it is currently worth to the 
entrepreneur, because they factor in the possibility that a new acquirer will dilute the value of the 
company in the future. As a result, entrepreneurs are reluctant to sell.  At the same time, when control 
value is high they do not want to sell a majority of votes in the market because they will not receive 
an adequate compensation for it. 
 
Several institutional variables, taken in isolation, seem to be associated with a lower level of private 
benefits of control: better accounting standards, better legal protection of minority shareholders, better 
law enforcement, more intense product market competition, a high level of diffusion of the press, and 
a high rate of tax compliance. The authors consider the possible role of tax enforcement in reducing 
private benefits, and thus indirectly enhancing financial development, as probably the most important 
new fact to emerge in their analysis. This is because tax authorities and non-controlling shareholders 
have a common objective: to ascertain the value produced by a company and get a share of it.  
 
Ownership Concentration in India 
 
In India there is the concept of a promoter as the controlling shareholder.  Promoter includes persons 
‘who are in control of the issuer’ or ‘who are instrumental in the formulation of a plan or programme 
pursuant to which specified securities are offered to public’ (SEBI 2009).  A minimum ‘promoter’s 
contribution’ of 20% of the share capital is necessary for a public issue.  This minimum contribution 
is required to be locked in for a period of three years.  Most Indian promoters are families.   
 
As shown in Table 7, the share of Indian promoters in the total shareholding pattern has remained 
steady at 45-50%. The share of foreign promoters increased only marginally from 5.6% in December 
2002 to 7% in March 2008. However, the share of FIIs more than doubled from 4.6% to 11%. The 
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Table 7: Per cent of total number of shares outstanding  







Indian promoters  51%  46% 
Foreign promoters  7%  5% 
Financial Institutions  6%  8% 
Foreign Institutional 
Investors  8%  5% 
Mutual Funds  3%  4% 
Bodies Corporate  6%  10% 
Individuals  13%  18% 
Others  6%  4% 
Total  100%  100% 
 
Source : NSE Factbook 2009, 2002 
 
Moody’s and ICRA (2007) have examined corporate governance in 32 companies in 16 prominent 
family-controlled Indian business  groups. These companies  cover  a broad cross-section of  Indian 
industry, and include 13 Sensex companies accounting for about 40% of the total Sensex market 
capitalization. According to an extract of the survey results shown in Table 8, many families exert 
control with less than 50% shareholding, whereas others own more than 74%. Promoter shareholdings 
in the study ranged between 26-90%, with a median of 50%.  Many Indian family-controlled groups 
have complex corporate structures. In such cases it can be difficult to assess ownership and control on 
the basis of public information.  
Table 8: Promoter Holdings  
(Select promoters and companies) 
 
Figures in US$bn  Company  Market capitalization 
March 2007 
Promoter holding 
 Tata     Tata Steel    11.5  31% 
     TCS    26.2  82% 
     Tata Power    4.7  32% 
     Tata Motors    7.5  33% 
     Tata Chemicals    1.7  32% 
 Birla     Grasim Industries    8.1  25% 
     Aditya Birla Nuvo    4  39% 
     Hindalco Industries    5.2  27% 
     Ultra Tech Cement    3.4  53% 
 Reliance (MDA)     Reliance Industries    86.8  51% 
     IPCL    3.6  47% 
 Reliance (ADA)     Reliance Energy    8.3  34% 
     Reliance Comm.  33  67% 
     Reliance Capital    10.3  52% 
     Adlabs    0.6  55% 
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Given the widespread prevalence of family controlled business groups there is a need to explain their 
emergence and persistence.  Khanna and Palepu (2005) offer the following explanation for the rise of 
concentrated  ownership  in  emerging  economies  like  India.    In  the  initial  stages  of  economic 
development many institutions necessary for the functioning of product markets, labor markets, and 
financial  markets  are  typically  missing  or  underdeveloped.    Groups  often  perform  functions 
traditionally performed by market institutions in more mature markets.  One such important function 
is similar to venture capital, consisting of identifying promising new business opportunities in the 
economy and exploiting them with in-house risk capital and managerial talent, which are traditionally 
in short supply in the economy at large. This, in turn, leads to the observed predominance of the 
business group type of organizational form in emerging economies.  In the case of India this process 
was aided by the state providing a protected environment, closed to foreign or domestic competition 
through export and import controls and tight industrial licensing policy.   
 
Tunneling by Indian business groups 
 
The expropriation of minority shareholders is often referred to as tunneling.  While there is significant 
anecdotal evidence on tunneling there are few systematic studies.  Like all ‘private benefits of control’ 
tunneling can be difficult to measure.   
 
Bertrand,  Mehta  and  Mullainathan  (2002)  provide  a  methodology  for  detecting  the  presence  of 
tunneling.  A business group usually completely controls several independently traded firms and yet 
has  significant  cash  flow  rights  in  the  form  of  direct  shareholding  in  only  a  few  of  them.  This 
discrepancy in cash flow rights between the different firms under control creates strong incentives to 
transfer, or tunnel, profits from firms with low direct shareholding to firms with high shareholding.  
They devise a test to measure the changes in profits of group firms (the response) relative to changes 
in the profitability of other firms in the same industry (the industry shock).   
 
Consistent with the theory they find that the profitability of group firms on average underresponds to 
the industry shock and this is larger in low direct shareholding firms. When this analysis is conducted 
separately  for  operating  and  non  operating  profits  they  find  that  it  is  the  underresponse  to  non 
operating profits that drives the results.  Group firms’ operating profits are, in fact, more sensitive to 
their own industry shock.   From this they conclude that profits are tunneled from low cash flow rights 
firms by manipulating the non operating profit component of total profits.  A related implication is 
that transfer pricing, which would affect operating profits, is not an important source of tunneling in 
India. 
 
Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007) examine the characteristics of intra-group loans, often cited as a 
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constitute 59% of operating profits in the year a firm receives loans.  Their evidence indicates that 
groups extend loans to financially weaker firms and significantly increase the extent of loans when 
member firms are hit with a negative earnings shock. The loans are made on terms more favorable 
than those of comparable market loans, consistent with the loans being used to provide subsidized 
support.     
 
Summing  up,  while  concentrated  ownership  is  common  around  the  world  there  are  significant 
differences in the extent of expropriation of minority shareholders as measured by the private benefits 
of control. This has lead to the distinction between efficient and inefficient controlling shareholder 
systems as in Gilson (2006).  In the inefficient system poor minority investor protection allows the 
cost of private benefit extraction to exceed the benefits of more focused monitoring of management so 
that minority shareholders are net worse off from the controlling shareholder’s monitoring effort.   
Alternatively,  in  the  case  of  efficient  controlling  shareholders  strong  protection  of  minority 
shareholders allows the benefits of more focused monitoring to exceed the costs of private benefit 
extraction so that minority shareholders are net better off.   
 
4.  Minority investor protection 
 
In  recent  years  there  has  been  extensive  focus  on  the  role  of  corporate  governance  in  financial 
development.    Several  international  organizations  have  developed  indices  to  make  cross-country 
comparisons on various dimensions of corporate governance. 
 
The World Bank’s Doing Business 2010 presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the 
protection of property rights that can be compared across 183 economies and over time.   One of the 11 
indicators  is  ‘protection  of  investors’  which  measures  minority  shareholder  protections  against 
directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. The data come from a survey of corporate 
lawyers and are based on securities regulations, company laws and court rules of evidence.  As shown 
in Table  9  India was  ranked  41
st  along  with other  countries  such  as  Botswana,  Bulgaria,  Chile, 
Mexico, Indonesia and Romania.  It may also be relevant that India is ranked 182 out of 183 countries 
in Enforcing Contracts so that even if the laws and regulations may be in place enforcing them may 
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Table 9: Doing Business 2010 : India 
 
Stage of business 
Rank 
(Total 183) 
Starting a Business  169 
Dealing with Construction 
Permits  175 
Employing Workers  104 
Registering Property  93 
Getting Credit  30 
Protecting Investors   41 
Paying Taxes   169 
Trading Across Borders   94 
Enforcing Contracts  182 
Closing a Business  138 
Ease of Doing Business 
(Overall)  133 
 
Source: World Bank and IFC, Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through Difficult Times 
 
 
The  World  Economic  Forum  produces  the  annual  Financial  Development  Report,  based  on  the 
Financial Development Index (FDI) which provides a score and rank for 55 countries according to the 
level  of  their  financial  development.    India  is  ranked  30  on  ‘Corporate  Governance’  and  50  on 
‘Contract Enforcement’.  Within Corporate Governance India is ranked 24 on ‘Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests’ and 35 on ‘Efficacy of corporate boards’. 
 
The  Asian  Corporate  Governance  Association  (ACGA),  Hong  Kong,  released  a  white  paper  on 
Corporate  Governance  in  India,  in  January  2010..    According  to  the  paper  despite  wide-ranging 
developments  in  regulation  and  policy,  corporate  governance  reform  in  India  has  not  adequately 
addressed the issue of accountability of promoters to other shareholders.  The paper identifies the 
following specific problems: 
 
 Shareholder Meetings and Voting: Shareholder meetings and proxy voting processes in India lack 
efficiency and accountability. There is a need to conduct voting on all resolutions at AGMs and 
EGMs meetings by a poll with an independent scrutineer to count and audit the vote. 
 
Related-Party  Transactions:  India  has  notably  weak  regime  governing  related-party  transactions. 
Typical related party transactions that listed companies engage in include spinning off valuable assets 
from  listed  companies  to  unlisted  private  entities  for  the  benefit  of  promoters;  spinning  off 
investments in group companies to a holding company, valuing the investments at a large discount to 
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business to unlisted private entities and letting an affiliated listed company pay for branding and 
distribution costs.   
 
Regulation needs to be overhauled and minority shareholders accorded much greater protection.  For 
example, there is a need to introduce stricter regulation on related-party transactions, including giving 
independent  shareholders  the  powers  to  approve  large  transactions  above  a  certain  limit  and 
enhancing disclosure requirements on other material transactions. 
 
 Preferential Warrants: The scope for the misuse and abuse of warrants in India is considerable. 
Regulation of their issuance to promoters needs to be tightened.  The issuance of preferential shares, 
warrants or other securities to promoters and other connected persons should be prohibited, as in other 
markets. 
 
 Corporate  Disclosure:  The  scope,  depth,  timeliness,  consistency  and  formatting  of  corporate 
financial disclosure in India could be greatly improved among listed companies 
 
The Auditing Profession: The Indian auditing profession is highly fragmented. It would benefit from 
some consolidation as well as an independent audit regulator.  The Government should establish an 
independent regulatory body for the audit profession. Such a body could draw its talent from among 
the many experienced auditors in India, including those who have worked overseas. 
 
Overall the report points out that relying largely on independent directors,  usually appointed by 
controlling shareholders, and greater corporate disclosure as the primary mechanisms to  protect the 
interests of minority shareholders is likely to prove weak and insufficient.. While Board reform is 
fundamentally important it needs to be complemented by a proper regime for the regulation of related-
party transactions. 
 
These recommendations are consistent with the self assessment of India’s financial sector carried out 
by the Committee on Financial Sector Assessment (CFSA) set up by the Government of India and the 
Reserve Bank in September 2006.  In the area of Corporate Governance the committee expressed the 
following concerns:
7 
In India, there is a comprehensive corporate governance framework in place for listed companies and the 
listing  agreement  forms  an  important  pillar  of  corporate  governance  framework.  There  is  a  need to 
strengthen the corporate governance framework with regard to risk management in listed companies. 
Listed companies need to disclose the reasons for non-compliance with non-mandatory requirements. 
                                                       
7  “Financial Sector Self Assessment finds System Broadly Robust but Identifies Specific Concerns” RBI Press 
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Steps  need  to  be  taken  to  protect  the  interests  of  shareholders,  such  as  equitable  treatment  of  all 
shareholders including minority shareholders and alternate methods of voting, which are convenient for 
shareholders  and  in  which  investor  associations  can  play  a  constructive  role.  There  is  a  need  for 
strengthening the disclosure mechanism to bring about greater transparency in ownership structures and 
stringent  penal  action  needs  to  be  taken  where  such  practices  are  unearthed.  Penal  provisions  for 
fraudsters may be strengthened in corporate law by providing for disgorgement of gains and confiscation 
of assets. The corporate governance framework needs to evolve with the changing times and there is a 
parallel need to strengthen the corporate governance framework for unlisted companies 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In a system of controlling shareholders minority investors discount the price they are willing to pay 
for shares to account for the possibility of expropriation.  This raises the overall cost of equity capital 
for new as well as existing firms.  Firms make fewer public issues and fewer households participate in 
equity  markets.    Minority  shareholder  protection  through  laws  and  regulation  and  their  public 
enforcement  can  reduce  the  private  benefits  of  control.  This  may  also  result  in  a  reduction  of 
ownership concentration.  However, from a long term perspective, the controlling shareholders system 
can only be diluted by encouraging the entry of new entrepreneurs.  It is in this context that India 
needs  to  improve  its  poor  ranking  on  “Ease  of  doing  business”.    An  environment  where  doing 
business is “not easy” is conducive for maintaining the position of incumbent business groups.  Such 
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